无我，谁在轮回（四）·既非同一个我，何以仍须在意¶

参考文献

1. Karl H. Potter (ed.), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 3: Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṃkara and His Pupils (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 115：“Śaṃkara is credited with a great many works, most of which are highly unlikely to be by him.”其后记 Hacker 与 Mayeda 辨别真伪的诸项检验，“all of which are satisfied by the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (by common consent the work of the Śaṃkara we are interested in)”。据原书页图核对。 ↩

2. 第一卷 8.6《印度佛教的衰亡》"商羯罗与佛教的哲学竞争"与"对商羯罗批判力度的评估"两段：前者据 Lorenzen 与 Nicholson 论商羯罗传记文学与不二论独尊叙事的晚出，判"他摧毁了佛教"为胜利者的事后建构；后者引 Ingalls 之结论。 ↩↩↩

3. George Thibaut (trans.), The Vedânta-Sûtras with the Commentary by Śaṅkarâkârya, Part I, Sacred Books of the East 34 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890)。据原书页图核对，下引各句均以页图为准。 ↩

4. 同上，II.2.19，404–407。佛教一方之说见 404；407 前后：“Moreover, that for the purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is, according to your doctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves itself merely and cannot be desired by anything else; hence final release also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as permanently existing up to the time of enjoyment and release, and that would be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency.”406 论蕴聚：“how much less then are aggregates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i.e. souls), and that which abides in them”，所依者即业力（adṛṣṭa）；论转生：“In the former case a human body could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned into an elephant or a god and again become a man”。 ↩

5. 同上，II.2.25，413–415。413：“That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to the same person who previously made the perception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man.”415：“But the conscious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation.” ↩

6. 同上，II.2.26–27，415–418；418：“And nobody would have to exert himself in the least either for going to the heavenly world or for obtaining final release.” ↩

7. 同上，II.2.32，428：“It has, in fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of life are mere folly.”“…has himself made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly confused.—So that—and this the Sûtra means to indicate—Buddha's doctrine has to be entirely disregarded by all those who have a regard for their own happiness.”同页前文以“like the walls of a well dug in sandy soil”为喻。 ↩

8. 《杂阿含》第 58 经（T0099，卷二）。大正藏校注出巴利对应 S. 22. 82. Puṇṇamā，即《相应部》22.82《满月经》；扩本为《中部》第 109 经《满月大经》。第一卷 13.3 有分析。 ↩↩

9. 第一卷 13.3《五蕴、四大与无我》：该章称满月经此问"坏在结构上"，我被用了两次，问句里用它索要一个受报者，盘算里用它豁免一个造业者；并记满月大经点出此问为渴爱所驱。 ↩

10. 《杂阿含》第 300 经（T0099，卷十二）。大正藏校注出 S. 12. 46. Aññatara。同卷第 302 经阿支罗迦叶问“苦自作耶”“苦他作耶”，佛陀以同一中道作答，校注出 S. 12. 17. Acela。 ↩

11. 世亲造、玄奘译《阿毘达磨俱舍论》卷三十《破我品》（T1558）。论敌之问“若一切类我体都无，刹那灭心于曾所受久相似境何能忆知”，世亲答“如是忆知，从相续内念境想类心差别生”，随后列忆念生起的条件：“从有缘彼作意相似相属想等，不为依止差别愁忧散乱等缘损坏功德心差别起”；天授、祠授之难与“相续一故”之答，“我体若无，是谁之念”“即生念因足为念主，何劳立我为念主耶”诸句，俱在此卷同一段，紧接破补特伽罗之后。据 T1558 原文逐字核对。第一卷 17.6 论此品的位置，谓无承担者的相续要独自承担记忆、责任与解脱。 ↩↩

12. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, “Śaṃkara's Arguments against the Buddhists,” Philosophy East and West 3 (1954): 291–306。295 论驳蕴聚一条：“Essentially, the Vedānta argument is one of theism against atheism.”296 论 2.2.19 末尾的两难：“Śaṃkara elaborates this argument more than Bhāskara but adds nothing substantially new.”297：“In only one sūtra on this topic does Śaṃkara add an argument that is both original and of basic importance. This is on II.ii.25: anusmṛteś ca.”298：“This is Śaṃkara at his best”；“It is worth noting that the Buddhist objection here is idealist rather than realist. This doctrine that what we call identity is in fact similarity is not pressed by the Sarvāstivādins. On the other hand, it is basic to the logic of Dharmakīrti and the Buddhist idealists.”同页论有从无生一条：“The criticism used by Śaṃkara and Bhāskara is that nothing can come from nothing.…They are, after all, only common sense.”“Of the seed, they said, it is not the perishing condition which causes the grass, but the non-destroyed parts of the seed which form parts of the grass.”同页末总结：“Śaṃkara's arguments against the realists contain substantially nothing new.”306：“seem to me not pointless but deeply significant and worthy of study.”据原刊页图核对。第一卷 8.6 注引其结论。 ↩↩↩

13. 第一卷 5.1《龙树与中论》：挂在"龙树"名下的著作种类庞杂，中观、密教、医方、炼丹都有，现代研究认定是好几位同名作者的叠合；能稳妥归于中观这一位龙树的，是《中论》《回诤论》等少数几部。 ↩

14. 正理派的这一诘难：《正理经》3.1.4 说，若身即是我，焚烧活人之身便无罪；婆蹉衍那（Vātsyāyana）的注径直针对佛教的刹那聚合说，造业者若只是一串刹那生灭的身、根、觉、受的聚合，造业的前一聚合与受报的后一聚合全然不同，造业者与所造之业脱了干系，未造业的反要承受它，为求解脱而修梵行也没有意义；乌德约塔卡罗（Uddyotakara）《正理释》说此条不是为了证明有我，只是指出否认有我之说的难处；瓦恰斯帕蒂·米希罗（Vācaspati Miśra）《释疏》说它对不承认善恶业的唯物论者无力，对不立我而立善恶业的佛教徒才有效。出处：《正理经》3.1.4 及婆蹉衍那注，Ganganatha Jha 英译（Gautama’s Nyāyasūtras with Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya, Poona Oriental Series 59, Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1939），257–259。经文：“[If the Body were the Soul, then] there would be no sin accruing from the burning (killing) of a living Body”（257）。注：“So that, the two (the doer and the experiencer of results) being entirely different, it comes to this that one (the preceding ‘Aggregate’) who did the act becomes dissociated from what he did (and from its consequences), while one (the later Aggregate) who did not do the act becomes saddled with it (and its consequences).”又谓如此则“there can be no point in leading the life of a ‘Religious Student’ for the purposes of Release (from birth and rebirth)”（259）。译者注引《正理释》：“This, says the Vārtika, is put forward, not as a proof of the Soul, but only as indicating the objectionable feature in the theory of those who deny the Soul”（259）；引《释疏》：“The Tātparya remarks that this argument can have no force against the thorough-going Materialist, who admits of no Dharma and Adharma, but it will be effective against the Bauddhas, who, while denying the Soul, do admit of Dharma and Adharma”（257）。据原书页图核对。 ↩

15. 同上，4.1.10 婆蹉衍那注，414：“On the other hand, he, for whom ‘Rebirth’ consists of the ‘birth of one entity and destruction of another entity’, would be faced with the absurdity that one entity would be deprived of the fruits of his deeds, while another would be saddled with the fruits of acts not done by him.” ↩

16. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984; 据 1987 年再次校订之重印本), §95 “Liberation from the Self,” 281：“I am less concerned about the rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of others.”据电子书核对；见第一篇。 ↩↩

17. Paul Williams, Altruism and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Curzon Critical Studies in Buddhism (Richmond: Curzon, 1998), ch. 2 “On Altruism and Rebirth: Philosophical Comments on Bodhicaryāvatāra 8:97–8,” 29–51（原刊 The Buddhist Forum III, 1994）。50：“Rationally Śāntideva, rGyal tshab rje and others are in a dilemma. The more they stress otherness between this life and future lives, the more they open themselves to the reply that there is no need to concern ourselves with future lives.…The more it is argued that there is a need to concern ourselves with future lives because it will be us, the less grounds there can be for arguing a concern with contemporary others.”同页谓此结果“would seem to follow that one person does the deed and another gets the result”。51：“Why I should concern myself with future lives when they will not be me Śāntideva has left undetermined, and it is a very real problem particularly for Buddhists in the modern world.”据原书页图核对。 ↩

18. 第一卷 13.8《作者体悟·形而上学的迷思》："无我之下，苦的重量不落在我上，落在无数未来将要误认有我、误认有我所的现象之上；那些现象会疼，疼是真的。于是灭苦不再是自保，是对这条相续下去的经验之流的慈悲。" ↩

19. 同上，ch. 5 “The Absence of Self and the Removal of Pain: How Śāntideva Destroyed the Bodhisattva Path,” 104–176。140：“It is part of the very concept of a pain that it is the pain of a subject.”141：“It makes no sense to refer to happiness, to refer to feeling cold, to refer to desire, to refer to compassion, without these being the happiness, feeling cold, desire, compassion of some subject.”同页论康德：“from this fact alone, while the essential subjectivity of mental events follows tautologously, nothing follows about the status, the nature or constitution, of the subject, whether for example it is merely a self or really a Self.”142：“On Śāntideva's extreme no-subject view there is no one undergoing pain, and thus there is no point is stopping pain.”（末句“is”原文如此。）111：“The ‘ought’ of unselfishness simply does not follow from the ‘is’ of anātman. And if as a matter of fact unselfishness does follow from [understanding] absence of self that is a contingent matter rather than one of logical entailment.”164：“I can quite consistently accept that I do not have an isolated monadic True Self and yet, qua Williams, this person here, repeatedly and selfishly put the interests of myself (if not my Self) before the interests of all others.”176：“Why we should be altruistic at all has still not been answered”。Williams 接受格鲁派所说世俗上存在的人，140：“dGe lugs scholars are absolutely right”。据原书页图核对。 ↩↩↩

20. 第一卷 13.5《轮回、六道、三界》注引《三明经》（DN 13 §§76–79；汉译《长阿含》第 26 经，T0001 卷十六）：慈、悲、喜、舍四心遍满一方乃至四方，每一心之后各系一句"此即通梵天之道"；佛陀不驳二婆罗门青年的目的地，只换其行程，以四住为梵天道。 ↩

21. 《杂阿含》第 335 经《第一义空经》（T0099，卷十三）。第一卷 13.3 注引此经，并举觉音《清净道论》XIX.19–20 同旨之颂：有苦而无受苦者，有作而无作者。第二篇第四节引其全句。 ↩

22. 《杂阿含》第 404 经（T0099，卷十五），巴利对应《相应部》56.31《申恕林经》，即掌中之叶之喻：佛陀自所见法、为人说者“如手中树叶”，因其“义饶益、法饶益、梵行饶益、明、慧、正觉、向于涅槃”；自知而不说者，如大林中的树叶；经末归于“于四圣谛未无间等者，当勤方便”。巴利本明言所说者即四谛，Bhikkhu Bodhi 英译（The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000）1858：“And what, bhikkhus, have I taught? I have taught: ‘This is suffering’; I have taught: ‘This is the origin of suffering’; I have taught: ‘This is the cessation of suffering’; I have taught: ‘This is the way leading to the cessation of suffering.’”据原书页图核对。第一卷 13.7 以此立章。 ↩

23. 《中阿含》第 106 经《想经》（T0026，卷二十六）。大正藏校注出 M. 1. Mūlapariyāya sutta，即《中部》第 1 经《根本法门经》。经末佛陀自述"我于地则知地"，水、火、风以下同。 ↩