无我，谁在轮回（一）·从我思到无我¶

参考文献

1. 笛卡尔《谈谈方法》第四部分，AT VI 32–33。据 Adam–Tannery 本（Œuvres de Descartes, vol. VI, Paris: Léopold Cerf, 1902）核对页图，长 s 录作 s。32：“Mais, aussitost aprés, ie pris garde que, pendant que ie voulois ainsi penser que tout estoit faux, il falloit necessairement que moy, qui le pensois, fusse quelque chose. Et remarquant que cete verité : ie pense, donc ie suis, estoit si ferme & si assurée…”33：“ie connû de là que i'estois vne substance dont toute l'essence ou la nature n'est que de penser, & qui, pour estre, n'a besoin d'aucun lieu, ny ne depend d'aucune chose materielle.” ↩

2. 笛卡尔《第一哲学沉思集》第二沉思。拉丁文据 The Latin Library 网站文本：“…hoc pronuntiatum, Ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum.”“Nondum verò satis intelligo, quisnam sim ego ille, qui jam necessario sum; deincepsque cavendum est ne forte quid aliud imprudenter assumam in locum meî.”“sum igitur praecise tantùm res cogitans, id est, mens, sive animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio.” ↩

3. Dan Zahavi, “The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications,” in Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 56–78, at 58–59：不同体验“are all characterized by the same fundamental first-personal self-givenness”，此即“a dimension of for-me-ness or mineness”；它“is not a quality like scarlet, sour, or soft”，它是“the distinct givenness or how of experience”；否认它“would be tantamount to a denial of the first-person perspective”。 ↩

4. 第一卷 1.5《最初的教法》，论"要消灭的我"的三层；该处并引休谟《人性论》卷一第四部第六节，与胡塞尔的先验自我作对照。 ↩

5. 同上，59：最基本的自我形式即由经验的自身显现所构成者（引 Michel Henry），扎哈维自称其说“occupying a kind of middle position between two opposing views”。 ↩

6. Plutarch, Theseus 23.1, in Plutarch's Lives, vol. I, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Loeb Classical Library 46, 1914; 据 1967 年重印本，页码同), 49：“The ship on which Theseus sailed with the youths and returned in safety, the thirty-oared galley, was preserved by the Athenians down to the time of Demetrius Phalereus. They took away the old timbers from time to time, and put new and sound ones in their places, so that the vessel became a standing illustration for the philosophers in the mooted question of growth, some declaring that it remained the same, others that it was not the same vessel.”据原书页图核对。 ↩

7. Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy, the First Section, Concerning Body, Part II, ch. XI “Of Identity and Difference,” §7, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. Sir William Molesworth, vol. 1 (London: John Bohn, 1839), 135–137；136–137：“For if, for example, that ship of Theseus, concerning the difference whereof made by continual reparation in taking out the old planks and putting in new, the sophisters of Athens were wont to dispute, were, after all the planks were changed, the same numerical ship it was at the beginning; and if some man had kept the old planks as they were taken out, and by putting them afterwards together in the same order, had again made a ship of them, this, without doubt, had also been the same numerical ship with that which was at the beginning; and so there would have been two ships numerically the same, which is absurd.”此例用以驳"同一在于形式"之说。据原书页图核对。 ↩

8. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), Book 1, Part 4, Section 6 “Of Personal Identity”。段号依 Hume Texts Online（davidhume.org），页码依 Selby-Bigge 本（SBN），据该站网页与 Selby-Bigge 1896 本电子书核对。1.4.6.3，SBN 252：“For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.”1.4.6.4，SBN 252：“they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.”1.4.6.11，SBN 257：“A ship, of which a considerable part has been chang'd by frequent reparations, is still consider'd as the same”。1.4.6.15，SBN 259：“The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies.”1.4.6.21，SBN 262：“all the nice and subtile questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties.” ↩↩

9. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984; 据 1987 年再次校订之重印本), ch. 10 “What We Believe Ourselves to Be,” 199–200：“I enter the Teletransporter.”“The Scanner here on Earth will destroy my brain and body, while recording the exact states of all of my cells.”“This will then create, out of new matter, a brain and body exactly like mine. It will be in this body that I shall wake up.”“Though I believe that this is what will happen, I still hesitate.”新型扫描器一段见 199–200。 ↩

10. 第一卷 6.2《无著：〈摄大乘论〉与阿赖耶识》"例二：瞬间移动佯谬"：把原地的粒子逐一换成新粒子，原粒子移到另一地重新组装，问哪一个是本体，并指出这是忒修斯之船的变体。冷冻与原粒子的运送是本篇补的。 ↩

11. 同上，211：“A person's existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events.”"进一步的事实"（further fact）之名见 210。 ↩

12. 同上，213–214，俱乐部之例；214：“When we ask an empty question, there is only one fact or outcome that we are considering. Different answers to our question are merely different descriptions of this fact or outcome. This is why, without answering this empty question, we can know everything that there is to know.” ↩

13. 同上，§94 “Is the True View Believable?,” 279：“What matters is Relation R: psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity, with the right kind of cause.”“I can believe this view at the intellectual or reflective level. I am convinced by the arguments in favour of this view. But I think it likely that, at some other level, I shall always have doubts.”“Something similar is true when I look through a window at the top of a sky-scraper. I know that I am in no danger. But, looking down from this dizzying height, I am afraid. I would have a similar irrational fear if I was about to press the green button.” ↩↩↩

14. 同上，§95 “Liberation from the Self,” 281：“My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared.”“I am less concerned about the rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of others.”同页至 282 论改写：“Instead of saying, ‘I shall be dead’, I should say, ‘There will be no future experiences that will be related, in certain ways, to these present experiences’. Because it reminds me what this fact involves, this redescription makes this fact less depressing.”“Instead of saying, ‘The person suffering will be me’, I should say, ‘There will be suffering that will be related, in certain ways, to these present experiences’. Once again, the redescribed fact seems to me less bad.” ↩↩

15. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Vermischte Schriften, neue vermehrte Original-Ausgabe, Bd. 1 (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1853), 99：“Wir kennen nur allein die Existenz unserer Empfindungen, Vorstellungen und Gedanken. Es denkt, sollte man sagen, so wie man sagt: es blitzt. Zu sagen cogito, ist schon zu viel, so bald man es durch Ich denke übersezt. Das Ich anzunehmen, zu postuliren, ist praktisches Bedürfniß.”据原书页图核对，拼法依该本。此则通行作 Sudelbücher K 76（Promies 编号），Promies 本未据核。扎哈维《主体性与自我》称之为“Lichtenberg’s famous critique of Descartes”，页码见下文所引该书之注。 ↩

16. William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1890), vol. 1, ch. IX “The Stream of Thought,” 224–225：“The first fact for us, then, as psychologists, is that thinking of some sort goes on.”“If we could say in English ‘it thinks,’ as we say ‘it rains’ or ‘it blows,’ we should be stating the fact most simply and with the minimum of assumption. As we cannot, we must simply say that thought goes on.”据原书 1931 年重印本（页码同初版）页图核对。 ↩

17. Dan Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 101：“Sartre accepted Lichtenberg’s famous critique of Descartes: the traditional rendering of the cogito affirms too much. What is certain is not that ‘I am aware of this chair,’ but only that ‘there is awareness of this chair’ (Sartre 1936, 31–32, 37).”同页引休谟《人性论》"每次向内寻找我自己"一段。 ↩

18. 同上，280：“If tomorrow someone will be in agony, it is hard to believe that it could be an empty question whether this agony will be felt by me.”“Nagel once claimed that it is psychologically impossible to believe the Reductionist View. Buddha claimed that, though this is very hard, it is possible. I find Buddha's claim to be true.” ↩↩

19. 同上，282：“When I review the arguments for this belief, and reconvince myself, this for a while stuns my natural concern for my future.” ↩

20. Hume, Treatise, Appendix，段号与页码依据同上注。App. 10，SBN 633：“But upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involv'd in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent.”App. 20，SBN 635：“But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness.”App. 21，SBN 636：“For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding.” ↩

21. 第一卷 13.3《五蕴、四大与无我》，开篇与末段。 ↩

22. 第二卷中观篇下篇第二章《集谛：中观的诊断打击哪一层》：第一、二节分后反思我执与前反思我感，第五节以婴儿、动物与丧失反思能力的人三个案例说明"前反思我感的存在，不依赖后反思我执的存在"。 ↩