Chapter 0 Guide to this essay¶
This essay proves a theorem. In its strongest form, the central proposition takes a single sentence: every metaphysical proposition asserting the existence of a really existing ontological entity is self-contradictory. Every term in that sentence needs a definition. What counts as existence, as an ontological entity, as real existence? Does self-contradiction mean a semantic contradiction or the self-defeat of an act of assertion? Once the definitions are clear, the argument proceeds by logic. If the strongest version can be proved, that is what we deliver; if it cannot, we identify the point at which it must be weakened and give an honest verdict. A proof that a weaker version is required is itself a conclusion at the level of a theorem. In form, this is the most unusual essay in the book. The preceding essays offer analyses; this one is a paper written to the standards of modern analytic philosophy, drawing its material from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the Vigrahavyāvartanī.
First, the format. The chapters of the earlier essays mostly run in parallel and can be read separately. The chapters here form a series, each link joined to the next. Later chapters use only what earlier ones have prepared. The exposition is chiefly in rigorous natural language, with propositions and definitions numbered and only a handful of symbols in use: the existential quantifier, conjunction, negation, implication, and the contradiction sign. In each chapter, numbered proposition blocks come first and prose explanations follow. The fully symbolic system, complete derivations, premise inventory, and diagram of dependencies are collected in Appendix A at the end of the essay.
Two routes through the text. Chapters 1 to 9 each have an upper and a lower half, separated by a horizontal rule. Chapter 10 is a first-person account and has no such division. The upper half uses rigorous scholarly language; the lower restates the same chapter in plain language. The rule is to change the language and add no content. Where the two diverge, the upper half governs. The fast route reads only the lower halves, losing none of the conclusions or their force. The slow route reads every upper half, then checks each step in Appendix A. Readers may skip the formal passages altogether. This is a promise built into the format: nobody needs to learn logical notation before understanding this essay.
The route through ten chapters. Chapter 1 states the proposition, with three definitions and one proposition in three versions. Chapter 2 checks the target. It establishes, word for word, that the definitions used in the proof come from the opponents' own criteria: the three conditions for intrinsic nature in the "Examination of Existence and Nonexistence," the Sarvāstivāda criterion of decomposition and analysis, and Saṃghabhadra's criterion of giving rise to cognition as its object. The original texts supply the evidence; these are no straw men of this book's making. Chapter 3 prepares the tools. It distinguishes the two kinds of negation, separates assertion from rejection, and gives a formal reading of the tetralemma. The logical equipment for the entire essay is assembled at once. Chapter 4 begins the proof, establishing the relational premise and setting out the core derivation, with the "Examination of Going and Coming" as a worked example. Chapter 5 answers the challenge of self-application. Emptiness too is empty; the result of applying the theorem to itself is handled by the level clauses, with the full exchange in the Vigrahavyāvartanī. Chapter 6 secures the other half. Because emptiness holds, all dharmas can be established; the two truths find their place here. Chapter 7 conducts a self-examination, testing anticipated failure modes one by one and judging the fate of each of the proposition's three versions. Chapter 8 takes the theorem outside its Buddhist setting for a trial application to a conceptual combination: an eternal, self-existent, immutable, omniscient being that creates the world by free will. Chapter 9 gives the verdict and delivers three inventories: theorem, tools, and remainder. Chapter 10 stands outside the proof. It recounts the author's encounter with Madhyamaka, how this theorem was sought out, and what came into view after it was found. It contributes no argument. Remove the whole chapter, and not a word of the first nine need change.
Independence from Buddhism. One point must be stated at the outset. If this theorem holds, it depends on no Buddhist premise. Its definitions come from the opponents' own criteria, and its derivation uses only logic. Buddhist material serves just three purposes here: documentary warrant for the definitions, historical instances of reductio, and evidence from forms of expression for particular readings. If the theorem stands, then, it is a tool anyone can use. The application beyond Buddhism in Chapter 8 tests that claim on the spot. Once this tool has been extracted from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, what remains of that treatise? The third inventory in Chapter 9 answers that question, which this book regards as one of the most interesting of all.
The connection with Essay 13. Two places carry the greatest weight in Part II. Essay 13 addresses the Buddha's silence on metaphysical questions; this essay provides a positive theorem. Silence comes first, proof later. This essay can be read as a belated statement of reasons for that silence.
Terminology and quotations. As in the preceding essays, Chinese terminology governs the renderings, with Sanskrit supplied in parentheses at first occurrence. Quotations from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā follow the Chinese translation in four fascicles, with verse numbers given where they occur. Page references accompany citations of Western-language works. More modern literature appears here than in earlier essays, but the rule remains the same. We draw on arguments; we do not make authority a premise.
Over to Chapter 1. First, define every term in that sentence.