Preface¶

I. What This Book Sets Out to Do¶

There is already no shortage of Chinese-language histories of Buddhist philosophy. Some adopt a sectarian standpoint and begin from faith; some amount largely to compilations of source material and offer little analysis; others emphasize the critical methods of modern scholarship but set a high bar for entry, making them difficult for general readers to approach.

This book is intended to occupy the middle ground between an academic monograph and a work for general readers. Its aim is to explain the most important problems of Buddhist philosophy, its most important thinkers, and their arguments in terms that a modern reader can follow, while maintaining as honest a historical approach as possible.

II. This Book Has a Point of View—and That Is Unavoidable¶

In a methodological essay published in 1904, Max Weber argued that there can be no objective analysis of social phenomena wholly independent of “particular and ‘one-sided’ points of view.” Whether it says so explicitly or not, every analysis selects and organizes its material from some perspective.¹ The same judgment applies to the study of history and philosophy.

This book will not pretend to have no point of view. Its judgments concerning the origins of Mahāyāna and its assessment of Mahāyāna thought, its reading of Theravāda historical narratives, and its position on Madhyamaka theories of liberation will offend some readers formed by particular traditions. Readers from Mahāyāna traditions may find parts of it uncomfortable; Theravāda readers may as well. The same applies to readers accustomed to certain prevailing narratives in academic scholarship.

The Buddha’s expression “knowing and seeing as it actually is” (yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti) means knowing things as they are, not as we wish them to be. This book adheres to that attitude as a matter of method, although we cannot hope to realize it perfectly.

How to place this book, and how to place the Dharma, are questions left to the reader.

III. Principles for Handling Historical Sources and Inference¶

This book does not accept sectarian legends as historical fact, but it does acknowledge their existence.

Buddhist traditions have preserved many narratives about the Buddha’s life, the councils, and the divisions among early schools. Many of them were products of attempts to construct sectarian legitimacy and do not withstand historical scrutiny. This book does not treat such narratives as historical facts. Yet the reasons they took the forms they did, and the roles they played in history, remain material worthy of reflection and analysis.

When the book presents a historical picture derived from sources and reasonable inference, phrases such as “this suggests” and “we may therefore infer” mark the distinction between inference and facts directly supported by textual evidence. The book’s own judgments and positions are identified with phrases such as “this book argues” or “the position taken here is.” This is a necessary compromise between rigor and readable prose.

History and philosophy are two different questions.

Whether an idea appeared in history, or was even widely accepted, is a different question from whether it is philosophically defensible. The historical sections aim at as neutral an account as possible. The philosophical sections present the structure of the arguments, but where this book considers a problem important, it also states its own interpretation and position explicitly.

An approach to chronology and geography.

The chronology of early Indian history remains disputed. When specific dates are involved, this book gives the range found in scholarship whenever possible and avoids creating an illusion of precision with a single number. Geography and ethnic background are supplied where necessary, but this is not a cultural history: the development of philosophical thought remains its main line of inquiry.

IV. How Philosophical Thought Is Treated¶

Arguments, not just conclusions.

What is emptiness? What does non-self claim? Why was the storehouse consciousness proposed? How do Madhyamaka arguments proceed? Merely reporting the answers to questions of this kind is pointless. This book reconstructs the steps in each school’s arguments as far as possible, both to give readers a basis for judgment and to reveal the tensions and exchanges among different systems of thought.

Comparisons with Western philosophy are tools for understanding.

Where appropriate, this book introduces concepts or frameworks from phenomenology, Kant, Hume, Wittgenstein, and other currents of Western philosophy as points of comparison for modern readers. Such comparisons should not be mistaken for claims that Buddhism was influenced by Western philosophy, that the two are equivalent, or that they “prove Buddhism was ahead of its time.” Their principal purpose is to help readers educated within modern Western paradigms understand Buddhist thought.

Treatment of terminology.

Sanskrit and Pali terms are given in transliteration when they first appear. A glossary at the end of the book provides Chinese, Sanskrit, Pali, and English equivalents together with brief explanations for ready reference.

A principle of nomenclature.

This book does not use “Hīnayāna,” the pejorative Mahāyāna label, nor does it use “Śrāvakayāna,” a term that presupposes a Mahāyāna scheme of doctrinal classification. Individual schools are called by their own names. Where a collective term is necessary, the book speaks of “practitioners of the path to liberation.” The reasons are discussed in the relevant chapters.

V. A Reading Guide for Philosophically Oriented Readers¶

This book combines historical narrative with philosophical analysis. Readers already familiar with the historical background—or interested primarily in the philosophy—may follow this route:

The starting point for the central concepts is Part I, Chapter 5 (“The Earliest Teachings: the Four Truths, Dependent Origination, Non-Self, and the Five Aggregates”). It provides the foundation for understanding every later philosophical development.

The philosophy of the early schools (Part III) is the immediate background to Mahāyāna philosophy. The most important topics are Sarvāstivāda’s thesis that “the three times all exist” (Part III, Chapters 1 and 2), Sautrāntika criticisms of Sarvāstivāda (Part III, Chapter 3), the analytical program of Theravāda Abhidhamma (Part III, Chapter 4), and the Pudgalavāda controversy over personal identity (Part III, Chapters 5 and 6).

The Madhyamaka school (Part V) lies at the heart of Mahāyāna philosophy. All five chapters are chiefly philosophical and are best read in full. The two centers of gravity are Nāgārjuna’s arguments in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Part V, Chapter 1) and Candrakīrti’s Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka (Part V, Chapter 5).

The Yogācāra school (Part VI) centers on the theory of the storehouse consciousness and arguments for Consciousness-Only. All five chapters are works of philosophical analysis. Chapter 5, “The Dispute between Consciousness-Only and Madhyamaka,” is the key point at which the fundamental disagreement between the two schools is set out.

Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-nature (Part VII) receive their most concentrated philosophical treatment in Chapter 2 (the Ratnagotravibhāga) and Chapter 3 (the relations among tathāgatagarbha, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka). This is the most philosophically controversial part of the book and contains more explicit statements of the book’s own position.

Logic and epistemology in late Indian Buddhism (Part VIII, Chapters 1 and 2)—the tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti—form an independent philosophical system. Readers with a strong philosophical interest should not skip them.

Within Chinese Buddhism, Tiantai (Part X, Chapter 5), Huayan (Part X, Chapter 6), and Chan (Part X, Chapter 8) each achieved philosophical innovations under the distinctive conditions of China. They were not merely vehicles for transmitting Indian thought.

Within Tibetan Buddhism, the philosophy of Tsongkhapa and the Gelug school (Part XI, Chapter 6), as well as Tibetan debates over Madhyamaka—especially the dispute between self-emptiness and other-emptiness (Part XI, Chapter 7)—represent the most profound continuation of Madhyamaka philosophy outside India and deserve particular attention.

The Theravāda doctrinal tradition (Part IX, Chapter 4) and Dzogchen and Mahāmudrā (Part XI, Chapters 3 and 4) also contain much of philosophical interest. Compared with the subjects listed above, however, they stand at a somewhat greater distance from the main philosophical controversies of the Indian tradition. Readers may approach them according to their interests.

VI. On the Use of AI¶

During the writing of this book, AI was used to generate initial drafts, retrieve and collate some source material, and polish the wording of certain passages.

The author personally read, checked, and revised every word of the main text. All decisions about historical facts, interpretive positions, and philosophical readings are the author’s own. Any AI-generated material the author found inaccurate or unsuitable was revised or deleted.

Citations are the part most prone to error. Through multiple rounds of proofreading and item-by-item checks against the original sources, this book has brought the risk of AI-introduced citation errors down to a level at least comparable to that of wholly human-authored work. Even so, the author’s abilities are limited, and errors are unavoidable. Readers are earnestly invited to report any errors in citation or interpretation.

Using AI is a use of a writing tool, not fundamentally different from consulting dictionaries and research databases or using typesetting software. The book discloses that use because readers have a right to know, not because it should either raise or lower the book’s credibility. The book’s credibility should be tested against its contents and arguments.

VII. Length and the Two-Book Structure¶

This volume is divided into two books. Book One, the history of philosophy, comprises Parts I through XII as they now stand: it follows the historical line and accounts for how each system of thought arose and developed across some twenty-five centuries. Book Two, philosophical analysis, will step outside the rhythm of historical narration and give a close philosophical reading to the systems this book considers most important; a topic covered in a single chapter of Book One may grow into a full part there. The parts currently planned: an analysis of the earliest teachings (cosmology, the unanswered questions, and more), the arguments of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with a reading of the text, later Madhyamaka philosophy, Yogācāra philosophy, tathāgatagarbha philosophy (including its Chinese developments), Huayan philosophy, and Faxiang (Chinese Yogācāra) philosophy. Both the list of parts and their chapter divisions remain subject to change.

Book Two has not yet been written. Until it takes shape, the lengths of the parts of this volume will not be proportional to the weight of the traditions they treat; readers are asked to treat the corresponding parts as a skeleton: the structure is in place, and the flesh has yet to be added.

Bibliographic conventions are given at the end of each chapter. See the appendix for the glossary.