Chapter 4: The four great masters and four forms of time¶

Dharmatrāta proposes a difference of kind, Ghoṣaka a difference of characteristic, Vasumitra a difference of position, and Buddhadeva a difference of relation. As the same substance of a dharma passes through the three times, each master answers what changes. Chapter 3 of Essay 15 has already examined the doctrinal form of each position and its difficulties. This chapter will not repeat that examination. It asks a different question and takes the dispute as this essay's specimen case. Why do the evaluators choose Vasumitra? What kind of reasons do they use in eliminating positions in reverse order? What constraints does this adjudication place on the later system?

The four positions in the original text. Fascicle 77 records four great Sarvāstivāda masters, each establishing the three times differently. The venerable Dharmatrāta says that kind differs; the venerable Ghoṣaka, that characteristic differs; the venerable Vasumitra, that position differs; and the venerable Buddhadeva, that relation differs.¹ Dharmatrāta uses the analogy of a gold vessel recast. Its kind changes while its substance does not. Ghoṣaka uses the analogy of a person desiring one woman who is not thereby said to be free of desire for other women. Of the three characteristics, one is joined and two are detached. Vasumitra uses a counting rod. Placed in the units position, it is called one; in the tens position, ten; in the hundreds position, a hundred. Its successive positions differ, but the rod's substance does not. Buddhadeva uses a woman who is called a daughter in relation to her mother and a mother in relation to her daughter. Her substance is no different, but her relations differ. The positions are presented in the order kind, characteristic, position, relation. Adjudication proceeds in reverse, first refuting Buddhadeva, then Ghoṣaka, then Dharmatrāta, and finally establishing Vasumitra.¹

The evaluators' reasons, classified one by one. Against Buddhadeva, a single present moment would constitute all three times in relation to what precedes and follows it, creating disorder among the times. Against Ghoṣaka, every dharma in each time is allowed all three temporal characteristics, so the three times are again disordered. Against Dharmatrāta, what could "kind" mean apart from a dharma's intrinsic nature? Moreover, when a dharma moves from future to present, its earlier kind should cease, and when it moves from present to past, its later kind should arise. That would mean arising in the past and cessation in the future. How could that be reasonable?¹ All three refutations use the same criterion, disorder. The verdict is one sentence. "Therefore only the third establishes the times well, since conditioned formations can have periods of activity." The evaluators also give the reason, "This master's account of the times contains no disorder, because it distinguishes the three times on the basis of activity."¹ Classify these passages by type, and the result is orderly indeed. Three refutations and one affirmation contain no citation of a sūtra and no appeal to transmission. All appeal to consistency of form. The arrangement of the three times must not be disturbed. This is selection by a standard of order, not victory through argument. The criterion of selection itself, expressed in "the correct position" and "disorder," is never argued for. There is another piece of evidence. The three refutations contain roughly four times as many characters as the single sentence of verdict. The effort goes into elimination. The position established is simply the one left over.¹

The cost of choosing the position theory. Position is determined by activity. What has not yet had activity is future; what is active now is present; what has ceased its activity is past. Adjudication chooses this theory because it is the most orderly, but the price of order is paid elsewhere. Once the entire distinction among the three times is entrusted to activity, questions arise that the system must answer and cannot. What is activity itself? Does it count as a dharma? Does it have three times? Chapters 1 and 3 of Essay 15 have already worked through this doctrinal difficulty. This essay adds its genealogy. The difficulty is not shared by all four positions. It belongs to the position theory alone and is a difficulty selected by adjudication. The evaluators chose the most convenient of four answers and thereby left its heaviest burden intact for later generations. Saṃghabhadra's comprehensive defense, discussed in Chapter 7 of Essay 17, takes up precisely this assignment.

The aftermath of adjudication. Once the position theory became orthodoxy, the three rejected theories did not leave the scene. The four differences of kind, characteristic, position, and relation continued to be cited together as a teaching template. More significant is a defense several centuries later. Saṃghabhadra restates the four positions and clears Dharmatrāta of an accusation. Dharmatrāta merely says that as dharmas pass through time, their substance and characteristics remain the same while their nature and kind differ. This agrees in part with the venerable Vasumitra. How, then, can he be classed with the non-Buddhist Sāṃkhyas?² A defender of orthodoxy looks back to defend a master whom his own school's evaluators rejected, and seeks to align him with the winner. This casts the effect of "The evaluation states" in a clear light. Adjudication stopped the dispute from proceeding; it did not extinguish the rejected doctrines. Diversity within orthodoxy survived by being cited without being adopted. Here is another aspect of the difference between adjudication and argument. A refuted argument dies. A doctrine ruled out lives on.

On to Chapter 5. The four great masters show positions set out and adjudicated within the system. The next chapter examines the roster at its edges, the Dārṣṭāntikas, the Bhadanta, the Vibhajyavādins, the Vātsīputrīyas, and the Mahāsāṃghikas. How does orthodoxy draw its own boundaries through its opponents?

References¶