Chapter 3: "The evaluation states," adjudication alongside argument¶
This is the essay's central chapter. The two Chinese characters 評曰, "The evaluation states," occur 289 times in the two hundred fascicles of classical Chinese. They exercise the authority of a verdict. After the various positions have been set out, they announce which is Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy. The related formula 如是說者, "Those who say as follows," occurs 207 times and marks the accepted position.1 As Chapter 1 noted, the attribution to five hundred arhats gives the work's verdicts the tone of a resolution. This chapter asks what lies beneath that tone. What supports the verdict? When do adjudication and argument coincide, and when do they part? What kind of truth is a doctrine fixed by adjudication?
The forms of "The evaluation states." The bases of the 289 verdicts fall into four categories. Some conclude with an argument, some cite sacred teaching, some follow textual form, and some are bare adjudications that offer nothing. The occurrences across the two hundred fascicles have been classified individually, with the following counts.2
| Basis of the verdict | Occurrences | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Concluding argument (reasons given) | 196 | 68% |
| Bare adjudication (nothing given) | 68 | 24% |
| Textual form (wording as the basis) | 18 | 6% |
| Sacred teaching (sūtras as the basis) | 7 | 2% |
Begin with the largest category. Two-thirds of the verdicts give reasons. At first glance, that proportion seems unfavorable to the claim that adjudication and argument are different things. The crucial part is the other third. Ninety-three verdicts provide no argument, and the three ways of doing without one each have their own form. Sixty-eight offer nothing. What follows "One should say this" is the correct answer, not a reason. Repeating which position is right counts as having finished. Eighteen rely on wording. A position is wrong because it conflicts with the wording of the Jñānaprasthāna or one of the six-foot treatises, or because it does not fit the section's form. Giving wording as a reason is precisely the form of adjudication rather than argument. It appeals to the root treatise's authority, not to reasoning. Seven cite sūtras. These are the work's only verdicts that seek a guarantee outside the system. Their low proportion is itself evidence. The ultimate basis of this orthodoxy lies in its own texts, not in the sūtras.
Of these three categories, sixty-eight is the number to remember. These are not residual oversights. They are a normal form permitted by the format. A treatise speaking in the tone of a resolution can simply announce a conclusion. In this category, the separation of adjudication from argument is literal.
The direction of adjudication. Can we identify preferences in whom the evaluators accept and reject? Three can be established. First, positions that make the form more orderly have the advantage. In the dispute among the four great masters, treated in detail in Chapter 4, the same criterion eliminates three positions: disorder. Second, positions that keep the substance of dharmas fixed have the advantage. In fascicle 76, "The evaluation states: Past and future things do not form aggregates as present things do; each remains separate." This single sentence assigns aggregation to the present and preserves the picture of dharmas abiding in their respective intrinsic natures across all three times.1 Third, positions that add fewer entities do not necessarily have the advantage. Both the verdict on nine coarising dharmas in fascicle 39 and the verdict on acquisition of acquisition in fascicle 158 choose the side that adds more. The first two tendencies favor order. The third shows that order takes priority over economy. Better to posit more dharmas than to allow disorder in the arrangement.
Who controls the brakes? The last section of Chapter 2 argued that this method cannot supply its own stopping point. This chapter adds that "The evaluation states" does the stopping. We must be clear about what it stops. Acquisition generates nonacquisition, and the four characteristics generate four subsidiary characteristics. Just as the subsidiary characteristics are about to generate a third layer, "The evaluation states" and "Those who say as follows" intervene and announce a halt. "In a single moment there are only three dharmas. Because they acquire one another, there is no infinite regress." "The arising of arising produces only one dharma, so there is no fault of infinite regress."1 What is stopped is the multiplication of entities that the treatise itself has set in motion, not an opponent's claim. "The evaluation states" is a brake in this book, not an ornament. A philosophical work that must equip itself with brakes has a method with no stopping condition of its own. That last point is the second beam supporting the verdict in Chapter 9.
The status of its truth. An orthodox position fixed by adjudication is a different kind of thing from a conclusion that prevails through argument. The former draws its force from the adjudicator's authority; the latter, from premises and reasoning. The Vaibhāṣikas themselves are aware of this distinction. Fascicle 1 quotes the Buddha telling Ānanda, "I have a profound Abhidharma, difficult to see and awaken to, not to be reasoned out, outside the domain of reasoning. Only those with subtle, acute wisdom can know it."1 To place Abhidharma outside the domain of reasoning is to declare in advance that the doctrine's ultimate guarantee does not lie within reasoning. The final chapter of Essay 15 recorded Vasubandhu's closing words, "The nature of dharmas is profound, outside the domain of reasoning." It is the same phrase. Both sides bring it out when argument reaches its limit. The difference is that the Vibhāṣā uses it as the system's foundation, while Vasubandhu uses it to cut his losses at one particular point. The truth claim of a system fixed by adjudication and ultimately guaranteed by sacred teaching is declarative. "Orthodox position" means that this view has been selected, not that it has been proved.
On to Chapter 4. We have classified the bases of verdicts and identified their direction. It is time to watch a complete case. The dispute among the four great masters is the work's most famous adjudication. The evaluators choose Vasumitra, giving a reason only eight Chinese characters long.
References¶
References
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Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra, two hundred fascicles, translated by Xuanzang, Taishō vol. 27 (T1545). The principal passages cited in this chapter are fascicle 1, T27, no. 1545, p. 3a4; fascicle 39, p. 199c25; fascicle 76, p. 395b19; and fascicle 158, p. 801a26. The 289 occurrences of 評曰 ("The evaluation states"), 207 of 如是說者 ("Those who say as follows"), and 3313 of 有說 ("Some say") all come from a complete search of the classical Chinese text in the CBETA edition. The thirty-four-fascicle sample contained 84 instances of "The evaluation states" in the first thirty-four fascicles of the modern Chinese translation. The renderings were not yet standardized, so 評曰, 評議說, and 評說 were counted together. The ratio of verdicts with reasons to bare adjudications was about two to one. The whole sample lay within the Miscellaneous Division. The category described in the main text as contradicting the root treatise's wording refers to sample verdicts that cited conflict with the Jñānaprasthāna's wording. The passage on aggregation in fascicle 76 reads: "The evaluation states: Past and future things do not form aggregates as present things do; each remains separate." The passage on acquisition of acquisition in fascicle 158 reads: "Those who say as follows: In a single moment there are only three dharmas. First, that dharma. Second, acquisition. Third, acquisition of acquisition. Through acquisition one possesses that dharma and acquisition of acquisition. Through acquisition of acquisition one possesses acquisition. Because they acquire one another, there is no infinite regress." In the account of nine coarising dharmas in fascicle 39, arising of arising produces only primary arising. The Buddha's words to Ānanda in fascicle 1 read: "I have a profound Abhidharma, difficult to see and awaken to, not to be reasoned out, outside the domain of reasoning. Only those with subtle, acute wisdom can know it." This is the same passage quoted in Chapter 3 of Essay 15. The modern Chinese translation appears in this site's Mahāvibhāṣā section, translated from the CBETA edition. ↩↩↩↩
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Scope and method of the four-category count. The base text is the classical Chinese of all two hundred fascicles of the Mahāvibhāṣā in the CBETA edition. 評曰 occurs exactly 289 times across the work. Each resulting verdict is the unit of classification. A verdict runs from 評曰 to the next 問 ("Question"), 有作是說 ("Some make this statement"), 有餘師說 ("Other masters say"), 有說 ("Some say"), 或有說者 ("Some, however, say"), 復次 ("Furthermore"), 評曰, paragraph boundary, or 250 characters, whichever comes first. Adjusting this window between 150 and 400 characters changes the counts in the four categories by no more than three, showing that the classification is not a product of window length. The categories are mutually exclusive, with precedence determined by the strength of the basis. Verdicts based on sūtras enter the sacred-teaching category, using markers such as 契經 ("sūtra"), 經說 ("the sūtra teaches"), 經言 ("the sūtra says"), 如世尊說 ("as the Blessed One says"), 佛說 ("the Buddha says"), 伽他 ("gāthā"), and 素怛纜 ("sūtra"). Verdicts that do not cite a sūtra but rely on wording in the root Jñānaprasthāna, the six-foot treatises, or the section's form enter the textual-form category. Its markers include 本論 ("the root treatise"), 論文 ("the wording of the treatise"), 發智 (Jñānaprasthāna), 品類足 (Prakaraṇapāda), 識身論 (Vijñānakāya), 施設論 (Prajñapti), 集異門 (Saṅgītiparyāya), names of divisions such as 定蘊 ("Concentration Division"), 違此文 ("contradicts this wording"), 順文 ("conforms to the wording"), 不能通 ("cannot account for"), and 此中說……故 ("because it says here ..."). Where neither applies but reasons are given, the verdict enters the concluding-argument category, with markers such as 所以者何 ("why is this?"), 何以故 ("for what reason?"), 以……故 ("because ..."), ……故 ("... because") and 是故 ("hence"), 由此 ("therefore"), 若……則/便 ("if ... then"), 勿 ("lest"), 有……過 ("has the fault of ..."), 便違 ("would then contradict"), 相違 ("contradicts"), 不應理 ("is unreasonable"), 如何 ("how?"), and 豈 ("could it be that?"). After formulaic judgments such as "They should not say this," "One should say this," "The preceding position is sound," "The first view is good," and "This is reasonable," together with restatements of the correct answer, have been stripped away, verdicts that provide nothing enter bare adjudication. The sacred-teaching and textual-form categories contain little text; all forty-six verdicts whose window contains the name of a sūtra, treatise, or division were checked individually against the original, and human review changed twelve initial machine classifications. The criterion was the sentence immediately following the judgment that supplied its basis; names of sūtras, treatises, or divisions appearing later as supplementary evidence or cross-references were not counted, nor were homographs such as 五識身 ("the five sense consciousnesses"), 八萬法蘊 ("the eighty thousand dharma aggregates"), or 欲色界身 ("a body of the desire or form realm"). The table gives the counts after these changes; the item-by-item table of all 289 verdicts, with machine and final classifications and review notes, is kept at
核查/工作/H分析-20260914/复算/R248-评曰289逐项.tsv, and the classifier script评曰分类.pyin the same directory (redone on 2026-09-14). The concluding-argument and bare-adjudication categories were sampled, not rechecked item by item. Their boundary case is a verdict that merely restates the correct position without giving a reason. This table consistently counts it as bare adjudication. An earlier round of sampling for this book used thirty-four fascicles of the translation, with eighty-four verdicts, about two-thirds giving reasons and about one-third bare. The proportions from the complete search agree with that sample. The earlier impression, however, was that textual form accounted for a substantial portion of the reason-giving verdicts. The complete search does not support this. There are actually eighteen such cases, and this chapter has been rewritten accordingly. ↩