02-法称的逻辑与认识论

Georges Dreyfus. Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti's Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations. Albany: SUNY Press, 1997.（迄今最全面的法称研究英文专著，含西藏诠释传统）

自性关联之说，参 Shōryū Katsura. "Svabhāvapratibandha Revisited." Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū（《印度學佛教學研究》）35 (1986): 473–476，尤见书内 475–474 页（该刊横排文页码倒排），论法称以因果性（tadutpatti）与同一性（tadātmya）二者为自性关联之基础。另参 John D. Dunne. Foundations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy. Boston: Wisdom, 2004，第三章 "Svabhāvapratibandha: The Basis of Inference"（书内 145 页起）。

法称《正理一滴》（Nyāyabindu）第三品第 110–114 节，尤其 112–113 节：第 113 节言果、自性、不可得三类正因之外，别无不离之因；第 114 节言相违决定（viruddhāvyabhicārin）只在依圣教的比量中立为过失。梵文与节号据 Shinya Moriyama. "A Comparison between the Indian and Chinese Interpretations of the Antinomic Reason (Viruddhāvyabhicārin)." In Chen-kuo Lin and Michael Radich (eds.), A Distant Mirror: Articulating Indic Ideas in Sixth and Seventh Century Chinese Buddhism. Hamburg: Hamburg University Press, 2014 (Hamburg Buddhist Studies 3), 121–150，书内 126 页所录。公版梵本见 Th. Stcherbatsky 校刊本（Petrograd, 1918, Bibliotheca Buddhica VII），书内 80–81 页；惟此本节号比 Moriyama 所用者大二，作第三品第 112–116 节，本注所说第 113、114 节即此本第 115、116 节，"sa iha kasmān noktaḥ" 一句此本不编号。

以果效能（arthakriyāsāmarthya）为胜义有之标准，见法称《释量论》（Pramāṇavārttika）第三品第 3 颂（依 Miyasaka、Dunne 通行编号；所据梵本依 Manorathanandin 品次，编号不同）。英译见 John D. Dunne. Foundations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy. Boston: Wisdom, 2004，附录 "PV3.1–10 with Selections from PVP and PVT"（书内 391 页起），书内 392 页作 "In this context, that which is capable of telic function is said to be ultimately real. The other one is said to be conventionally real. They are, respectively, the particular and the universal."；其义另参同书第二章 "Dharmakīrti's Method and Ontology"（书内 53 页起）。

John Dunne. Foundations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy. Boston: Wisdom, 2004（Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism）。上文所述由概念转为直接经验一段，见书内第 306 页："The way a yogin attains that exalted state, however, is precisely that, as an ordinary person, she focused in meditation upon a concept—i.e., one of the sixteen aspects—until she attained a direct, nonconceptual experience of that content."邓恩并指出此说要害在可信性：所转出的禅定经验若欲成量，其所自出的概念认识本身须无可疑。"生动"（spaṣṭa）一语为法称专属现量而不与比量共，其瑜伽现量的论证在《量评释》三之二八一至二八七，见书内第 24 页注二五。

Mark Siderits, Tom Tillemans, and Arindam Chakrabarti (eds.). Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.（含法称对遮诠论的修正）