Hayes 通检坐实两支：独立正量归二——「Sensation and reasoning are the only two means of acquiring knowledge」「Dinnaga himself recognizes only two such standards」；圣言量依赖比量——「Dinnaga maintains that in the final analysis there is no distinction between the process of acquiring information through reasoning and...through scripture」。
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全书框架亦自陈是与正理派《正理经疏》等婆罗门文献「in opposition to which the Buddhist theories were formed」，对应「不依赖正理派框架、正面挑战」一句。判确，脚注不必改。
Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1: A hypothetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit text with the help of the two Tibetan translations……and the linguistic materials gained from Jinendrabuddhi’s Ṭīkā；题名、著者、重构依据俱在。
Apoha Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition - Mark Siderits 与 Tom Tillemans 与 Arindam Chakrabarti (eds.) - 2011
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书内第 vii 页（序）
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版权页著录与脚注逐项相符：Siderits、Tillemans、Chakrabarti 三人合编，Columbia University Press 2011，ISBN 978-0-231-15360-7。序首句即「This is a book about the Buddhist nominalist theory of apoha. The basic idea of the apoha theory is that a general term like “cow” refers to all those things that are not non-cows」，正与正文第 117 行的「牛／非牛」之例同一（书影 `apoha-vii`）。
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序并记此书出于 2006 年 5 月洛桑近郊 Crét Bérard 的四日会议，与会十四人，兼有印度学佛学诸家与语言哲学、认知科学各家，故「多角度研究文集」一语不虚：目次中既有 Pind 论陈那遮诠的预设、Hattori 论《正理花簇》所引，也有 Ganeri〈Apoha, Feature-Placing, and Sensory Content〉、Hale〈Apoha Semantics〉、Gillon〈Classical Semantics and Apoha Semantics〉这类分析哲学一侧的篇章。 旁得：正文第 125 行所记库马里拉的循环之难，此书亦为通说所本（书中记耆那教与弥曼差同以「positive predicates cannot all be given a negative meaning……to say that all our words mean them is to turn all words into empty terms」相责），且另有 Hugon 专篇〈Dharmakīrti’s Discussion of Circularity〉治法称的回应，第一卷同篇第二章第 122 行「因果方案是否走出了循环」一节可由此再进一层。
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序首句即本书宗旨：「This is a book about the Buddhist nominalist theory of apoha. The basic idea of the apoha theory is that a general term like “cow” refers to all those things that are not non-cows.」——与正文第 117 行「牛／非牛」之例同一。序并记此书出于 2006 年 5 月洛桑近郊 Crét Bérard 的四日会议，与会十四人，兼有印度学、佛学与语言哲学、认知科学诸家，故脚注「多角度研究文集」不虚。
