05-道谛之二：无主张与修行的张力

"无主张"的纲领性表述见《回诤论》（Vigrahavyāvartanī）第29颂："若我有少宗，则我有彼过；我既无有宗，故我唯无过。"对"量"的批判（量若须量成则无穷倒退、量若自成则失其为量）见同论第31颂以下。英译与研究见 Jan Westerhoff. The Dispeller of Disputes: Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010；另见其 Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 165–199。

月称对自续论式的批驳见《明句论》首品（并见上篇第三章所引）；他在同处批判陈那系的量论建构，同时承认世间名言中现量、比量、譬喻量、圣言量四量依世间共许而成立。月称认识论的系统研究见 Dan Arnold. Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South Asian Philosophy of Religion. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005。

《菩提道次第广论·毗钵舍那章》英译见 Tsong-kha-pa. The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, Vol. 3. Trans. Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee. Ithaca: Snow Lion, 2002（此英译本第三卷：名言量一段见其书内第 173 页，"Still, it is not impossible for sensory consciousnesses to be valid cognitions that posit objects such as forms, sounds, and so forth conventionally… it is not at all established by conventional valid cognition. Therefore, in terms of conventional consciousnesses, they are not mistaken"，不为错乱因缘所坏之名言一段见第 180 页；汉译则有法尊译本全二十四卷（CBETA 中华藏 B0067），毗钵舍那章自卷十七起，讫于卷二十四。上文所述名言量之义见卷十九："然諸根識於名言中，是能立色、聲等境之量，無不應理。立彼諸識錯亂之因，謂如所現無自相義，此乃觀察有無自相之理智所能成立，非名言量之所能成，故待名言量，非為錯亂。"卷二十一复斥以名言分别尽为实执之说，谓"未為錯亂因緣所壞世間名言所建立義"不当以正理违害，且以此见为"證中觀義最大障礙"）。《辨了义不了义善说藏论》英译见 Robert A. F. Thurman. Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984。其书内第 343 页于此说最切："this very fact of the indispensability of conventional validating cognition as the cause of encountering the supreme reality is the import of (Nagarjuna's famous) statement: 'Without relying on conventions, the supreme reality will not be understood.'"所引即《中论》第二十四品第十颂，该页注一五七并录其梵文。本章所论无主张之张力在藏地的实际后果，Thurman 于导论第 80 页有记：俄译师（rNgog Lotsawa）辈误读龙树、提婆"they assert no position"（pakṣa）之语，遂谓中观于名言亦无量可立，"only presenting things according to sheer illusion to go along with others"，宗喀巴所对治者正是此解。宗喀巴对名言量与二谛的处理，另参 Thupten Jinpa. Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy: Tsongkhapa's Quest for the Middle Way. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002，第五章。书内第 155 至 156 页论名言有的判准：其一须合于世间共许，其二须"not be contradicted by another nominally valid cognition"，并引《广论》见绳谓蛇、见阳焰谓水之例，谓此等所执"invalidated by other valid conventional [cognitions]"，故于名言亦非有。

格鲁派内部实修传统与应成宗义之间的灰色地带，最显眼的例证是一世班禅罗桑却吉坚赞所传"格鲁噶举大手印"（dge ldan bka' brgyud kyi phyag chen），其根本颂与教授见 H. H. the Dalai Lama and Alexander Berzin. The Gelug/Kagyü Tradition of Mahamudra. Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1997（本书所据为 Berzin Archives 网络版，页码与印本不通）。

"无主张"问题在当代学界有独立的辩护与批评传统，与本章构成隐性对话：Tom J. F. Tillemans. How Do Mādhyamikas Think? And Other Essays on the Buddhist Philosophy of the Middle. Boston: Wisdom, 2016；Jan Westerhoff. Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 183–198（第九章对语义的、论证的与超越的三种解读的辨析）。对这一系文献的正面回应，见本书第二卷第七篇第二至四章。