05-补特伽罗问题

它要解决的，正是别家含糊带过的那串问题：谁在六道里轮回？谁记得起前事？谁造业又谁受报？谁最后证入涅槃？犊子部说：是补特伽罗。

Vasubandhu. Abhidharmakośabhāṣya，第九品《破我品》（Pudgala-pratiṣedha）。Trans. Louis de La Vallée Poussin；Eng. trans. Leo M. Pruden, Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1988–1990。汉译《阿毗达磨俱舍论·破执我品》见卷二十九、三十（T29, no. 1558）。世亲逼犊子部作实假二择的一段，汉译作："然犢子部執有補特伽羅，其體與蘊不一不異。此應思擇，為實為假。實有假有相別云何？別有事物是實有相，如色聲等。但有聚集是假有相，如乳酪等。許實許假各有何失？體若是實應與蘊異，有別性故，如別別蘊。又有實體必應有因，或應是無為，便同外道見。又應無用，徒執實有。體若是假，便同我說。"　二难的要害正在这里：说实有，则补特伽罗成了离蕴别立之物，要么另有生因、要么是无为，而且于事无补；说假有，则与世亲自己的立场无异。本书所谓"功能上真实而本体上无独立实体"不融贯，指的就是这一逼问；世亲并未直接讨论现代意义的涌现概念，此处是本书的转述。又，重担经一段见卷三十："然恐謂此補特伽羅是不可說常住實有，故此經後佛自釋言：但隨世俗，說此具壽有如是名。"

Leonard C. D. C. Priestley. Pudgalavāda Buddhism: The Reality of the Indeterminate Self. Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for South Asian Studies, 1999, pp. 21–22, 165–183, 208–225。规模一项见该书书内第 31 页："The Sāṃmitīyas became the largest of the non-Mahāyāna schools. When the great Chinese monk Xuánzàng travelled through India in the seventh century CE, he found 66,000 monks of the Sāṃmitīya in over a thousand monasteries, distributed throughout the Indus and Ganges basins and in the land between, but concentrated especially in the west; this represented about half of the monks in the Early Schools and (since there were roughly as many monks in the Early Schools taken together as in the Mahāyāna) a quarter of the total population of Buddhist monks in India"，其数据归于 Lamotte, 1958: 599–601。同页并记犊子部与正量部的鸠鸠罗一支活到十世纪，与印度佛教相始终。（该书此页把玄奘的汉字名误植作"玄藏"。）正文改"主流的大宗"为"最大的部派之一"，即依此条收窄：Priestley 所比的是非大乘诸部之间，不是与大乘相比。

Shwe Zan Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids (trans.). Points of Controversy (Kathāvatthu). London: Pali Text Society, 1915；巴利校订本参 Arnold C. Taylor (ed.), Kathāvatthu. London: Pali Text Society, 1894–1897, combined reprint 1979，开篇 Puggala-kathā 见 pp. 1–68。

Derek Parfit. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984（本书所据为 1987 年再次校订之重印本，含 1985、1987 两次校订说明；人格同一性的还原论与"进一步的事实"之辨，Further Fact View 之名见书内第 210 页）。

补特伽罗的"反还原论／涌现论"读法，见 Leonard Priestley, "Pudgalavāda Buddhist Philosophy," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy，其条列补特伽罗之解诸问，首问即"Was it simply the five aggregates taken together as a totality but which was not reducible to its parts?"。不以为然者见 James Duerlinger. Indian Buddhist Theories of Persons: Vasubandhu's Refutation of the Theory of a Self. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003，书内第 70 页注一〇〇把"a person is 'the structural unity' of the aggregates and that a person is a whole of parts that is not reducible in existence to his parts"记为"views put forward by some scholars"，并谓此类看法"seem to rest on the assumption that persons cannot exist apart from the collection of their aggregates"，其前注且言诸派论书于对手之说多所失真；世亲破我一侧即以此书为主。