本地 T1579 可核粗重、轻安、世间静虑不拔种子,T1585 卷九可核二障粗重与五位伏断;所指第二篇下篇第一章亦存在并承担比较,括注相合。
本地 T1579 可核粗重、轻安、世间静虑不拔种子,T1585 卷九可核二障粗重与五位伏断;所指第二篇下篇第一章亦存在并承担比较,括注相合。

This paper argues that the role of experience in the history of Buddhism has been greatly exaggerated in contemporary scholarship;the privileging of experience may well be traced to certain twentieth-century Asian reform movements, notably those that urge a “return” to zazen or vipassana meditation, and these reforms were profoundly influenced by religious developments in the West;
such discourse turns out to function ideologically and performatively—wielded more often than not in the interests of legitimation and institutional authority。卷期页码(Numen 42.3 (1995): 228–283)亦与本著录合。判仍确(前记已言三者只增其厚度,非补其缺)。
脚注所记「Sharf 论禅修「经验」叙述的话语建构性」之据。同页提要并作 This paper argues that the role of experience in the history of Buddhism has been greatly exaggerated in contemporary scholarship,及 such discourse turns out to function ideologically and performatively—wielded more often than not in the interests of legitimation and institutional authority。该本系扫描补,错字多,引文已回看版面。
…必有用?又獨頭之意是業果心,因緣變故,亦應有用。由此故知第四說善。「因緣」者法體實從真種子生。從真種子生者,所變有用。餘名分別:性境不隨心,獨影唯從見,帶質通情本,性種等隨應。性境全及,帶質一分,是因緣變。獨影及帶質一分,是分別變。然帶質境可通因緣、分別二門,從種及見二門攝故。若所緣心無心用者,見分為…
判语久挂"无从核"而其实已可核,今转确。前记(2026-09-09)已复核两源而记"正文无须动",惟判语未随之更新。」";②T2016《宗鏡錄》卷六十八作"大約有三境。頌云。性境不隨心。獨影唯從見。帶質通情本。性種等隨應。"——卷次與脚注所标分毫不差,後者之文字亦與脚注所录全同(前者同卷别处作"獨影唯從見",注中已记此异)。至于"旧传为玄奘所立"一层,正文自用"旧传"二字守住:署名史无从坐实,而正文并未坐实它,是此处该有的分寸。
…善法應無起時,以不相應恒現前故。既諸善法容有起時,故知隨眠是相應法。此皆非證。所以者何?若許隨眠非相應者,不許上三事是隨眠所為。然經部師所說最善。經部於此所說如何?彼說欲貪之隨眠義,然隨眠體非心相應非不相應,無別物故,煩惱睡位說名隨眠,於覺位中即名纏故。何名為睡?謂不現行…
為欲貪體即是隨眠?為是欲貪之隨眠義?」并指出两难——「若是欲貪之隨眠義,隨眠應是心不相應,便違對法」。有部一侧:「毘婆沙師作如是說:欲貪等體即是隨眠……阿毘達磨依實相說,即諸煩惱說名隨眠,由此隨眠是相應法」;同段又言「或經於得假說隨眠」,即以「得」系属之说。经部一侧:「然經部師所說最善……隨眠體非心相應非不相應,無別物故,煩惱睡位說名隨眠,於覺位中即名纏故……何名為睡?謂不現行種子隨逐。何等名為煩惱種子?謂自體上差別功能,從煩惱生能生煩惱」,并明斥有部另立不相应之说「若執煩惱別有隨眠心不相應名煩惱種……差別因緣不可得故」。脚注所述「有部以得系属、经部说为种子」之争,与此段全合。同书第
11 页又指出「The term bhavanga occurs in the Paṭṭhāna of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and in the Milindapañha. However, it is in the Pali Buddhist exegesis that we find a detailed account of it」——有分心的详说出于注释而非本典,脚注作「上座部注释传统」用语准确。
卷首自题「分別隨眠品第五之一」。同段有部一侧在距段首 189 处:「毘婆沙師作如是說:欲貪等體即是隨眠……由此隨眠是相應法」,并有「或經於得假說隨眠」一句,即脚注所谓以「得」系属;经部种子说在距段首 457 处:「何等名為煩惱種子?謂自體上差別功能,從煩惱生能生煩惱」。


為欲貪體即是隨眠?為是欲貪之隨眠義?」并指出两难——「若是欲貪之隨眠義,隨眠應是心不相應,便違對法」。有部一侧:「毘婆沙師作如是說:欲貪等體即是隨眠……阿毘達磨依實相說,即諸煩惱說名隨眠,由此隨眠是相應法」;同段又言「或經於得假說隨眠」,即以「得」系属之说。经部一侧:「然經部師所說最善……隨眠體非心相應非不相應,無別物故,煩惱睡位說名隨眠,於覺位中即名纏故……何名為睡?謂不現行種子隨逐。何等名為煩惱種子?謂自體上差別功能,從煩惱生能生煩惱」,并明斥有部另立不相应之说「若執煩惱別有隨眠心不相應名煩惱種……差別因緣不可得故」。脚注所述「有部以得系属、经部说为种子」之争,与此段全合。同书第
11 页又指出「The term bhavanga occurs in the Paṭṭhāna of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and in the Milindapañha. However, it is in the Pali Buddhist exegesis that we find a detailed account of it」——有分心的详说出于注释而非本典,脚注作「上座部注释传统」用语准确。
两图分管两事:其一,有分心三功能之首即保任一期生命的相续不断;其二,bhavanga 一词虽见于《发趣论》与《弥兰陀问》,其详说却出于巴利注释一系,脚注作「注释传统」不误。
本地 T1579 卷十一明说世间静虑但渐舍粗重、不拔种子,卷十三亦说世间定未永害随眠;T1585 卷九至十所列伏断分齐与脚注相合。


法尊译《入中论》颂与自释(月称造,颂 1–28 页、自释 29 页起)。两偈逐字对过,页 10 作「由业非以自性灭 故无赖耶亦能生 有业虽灭经久时 当知犹能生自果」与「说有赖耶数取趣 及说唯有此诸蕴 此是为彼不能了 如上甚深义者说」,与脚注所引一字不差。密意判释见自释页 86:先云阿赖耶等「此等一切皆是密意增上而说」,继问「此中为谁密意而说」,答「若诸众生,由其长夜习外道见,不能悟入甚深法性……最初为说阿赖耶识等,令其先除外道邪见,导入大义,后由无倒了达经义,自能放舍阿赖耶等」,与脚注所述判为对未能受持甚深法者的密意教相合。
前图所见两颂逐字与脚注相合:无阿赖耶亦能续生果报,而说阿赖耶、数取趣与诸蕴是为不能了达甚深义者。后图继述此类说法皆属密意,且以先除外道邪见、导入大义为其次第。

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Eckel《Bhāviveka and His Buddhist Opponents》全 516 面。该书实为《中观心论》第四、五两品连《思择焰》注的梵藏文校订、英译与研究(版权页著录:「Chapters 4 and 5 of Bhāviveka's Madhyamakahṛdayakārikāḥ with Tarkajvālā Commentary, Translated and edited with introduction and notes」,Harvard Oriental Series 70,ISBN 9780674032734)。著录宜改一处:该书由哈佛
梵文与印度学系出版、哈佛大学出版社发行,扉页作「PUBLISHED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF SANSKRIT AND INDIAN STUDIES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY / DISTRIBUTED BY HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS」;径作「Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press」是以发行者为出版者,宜补 Harvard Oriental Series 70 及实际出版单位。脚注所标之物与此书正相当:其第五品即〈Analysis of Reality According to the Yogācāras〉,汉译作《入抉择瑜伽行真实品》,脚注指认无误,且该书即此品之校译本身,非仅「研究与译注」。所论内容亦对:全书 parikalpita 十三见、paratantra 二十二见、pariniṣpanna 四十一见,即三性之名俱在;mind-only 五十九见、external object 七十八见,即唯识无境一系之诤。该书并指出清辨此品之自我定位:其开卷颂及注中谓「other scholars」自无著、世亲以下,自许其道胜于中观,清辨乃起而破之——作者据此驳多罗那他以来「中观瑜伽之诤由清辨所造」之说,谓「Bhāviveka's chapter on the Yogācāras shows that he understood the situation quite differently」。此层可供正文他处取用。

Waldron《The Buddhist Unconscious》(RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) 。「辩护方『佛教无意识』读法」一侧至此可核:该书开宗即言「the “cognitive unconscious” is now widely accepted within cognitive science and philosophy of mind… one of our aims is to introduce this fascinating concept into current Western discussions of unconscious mind」,并以「two-tiered model of mind」概括《摄大乘论》的结构。本行转确。
「佛教无意识」读法的出处:该书以「two-tiered model of mind」名阿赖耶识的结构,并自陈欲将此概念引入当代西方关于无意识的讨论。

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Gallica 著录「Triṃśikā (La trentaine), avec le commentaire de Sthiramati / original sanscrit publié pour la première fois, d'après des manuscrits rapportés du Népal」。正文书 41 行「安慧的《三十颂释》则有梵本存世」由此担。②「真谛译籍近于安慧一系为学界通说」: Diana Y. Paul《Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China》(Stanford 1984,书目 0389,)书内 1
49 页「[Wŏnch'ŭk implies] that there was some doctrinal relationship between Paramartha and Sthiramati, but he does not specify the exact affinity. The Yogācārabhūmi, in Paramārtha's interpretation of portions of it entitled CTTL, is taken to be one of the primary sources for the notion of an affinity between his thought and Sthiramati's」;132 页并记真谛于转依「remains close to the verse itself and to Sthiramati」,而于依他起「diverges significantly from both thinkers」;书末注亦言「At least in this matter Sthiramati and Paramartha share the same doctrinal views」(引佐佐木)。是「近于安慧」确为学界所持之说,惟 Paul 亦记其异处。③「安慧一系判见分相分同属遍计所执」(正文书 41 行):Paul 书末注引圆测《辩中边论疏》「Dharmapala viewed the dualism as paratantra whereas Sthiramati viewed it as parikalpita(T.1835-44.16b26-28)」,并引 Lévi 本页 40 安慧释第二十一颂「grāhyagrāhakabhāvaḥ parikalpitaḥ」,合。惟霍韬晦《安慧「三十唯識釋」原典譯註》(书目 0870,1980)自序谓「最明顯的,莫如稱安慧為一分家,安慧其實未言」,是「一分家」之名出后世疏家。已更新: 注补 Lévi 丛书项與出版者;「学界通说」一语落实为 Paul 1984 书内 149、132 页(并存其异见);补霍韬晦「一分家」一说之出处。正文不动。